The author présents the reasons for the introduction of Bill 33 in British Columbia, examines the disputes which were settled under it, évaluâtes its impact on the frequency and the duration of work stoppages, and its rôle in the future of labour management relations in this province.
One of the most controversial pièces of labour législation in the history of the Canadian labour movement has now been in effect for over two years. It is time for an objective assessment of the reasons for the introduction of such législation, the disputes which were settled under it, its impact on the frequency and the duration of work stoppages, and its rôle in the future of labour management relations in the province of British Columbia.
PROVISIONS OF THE ACT
Bill 33, or The Médiation Commission Act, widely hailed as the first compulsory arbitration législation in peace-time North America covering the private sector, was passed on December 2, 1968 ; it is pro bably one of the most sophisticated labour laws ever adopted to institu tionalize conflits regarding interest disputes and to provide government assistance and/or compulsion in the resolution of conflicts l . It provides a médiation commission to conduct inquiries and heariings on labour disputes 2 . The Commission acts and conducts its hearings in a manner not unlike a court proceeding but it has greater flexibility than a labour court in taking évidence and compelling the attendance of witnesses, nor is it bound by the technical rules of légal évidence. The controversdal part of the Bill is that which provides that the décision of the Commission after a hearing can be made binding upon the parties for two years by the order of the Provincial Cabinet if this is deemed necessary in the interest and welfare of the public. The hearing may be requested by either or both parties involved in the dispute or directed by the Minister of Labour at his own discrétion. The décision to be rendered can be made binding prior to the hearing if both parties agrée in advance.
LABOUR AND EMPLOYER ATTITUDES
Labour fought long and hard against Bill 33. Almost every major labour leader in British Columbia spoke out against it. The Président and the Secretary-Treasurer of the B. C. Fédération of Labour, the Régional Président of the IWA, the Président of the CUPE, the Président of the ILWU joined in unison in their opposition to the Bill. They organized protest démonstrations, created a « Beat Bill 33 » fund, and engaged in an active campaign against the Bill. There were a few labour leaders who supported the Bill, but their voice was the voice of the minority. This was not the first time that labour had fought against new labour légis-lation. The labour movement had fought the introduction of the Labour Relations Act, which is very similar to the Fédéral Labour Relations and Disputes Investigation Act 3 . It also fought the revision of the Trade Unions Act in 1959 4 . Like ail previous labour législation introduced by the présent government, Bill 33 was a partisan bill. The Bill was by a vote of 22-28, with ail the NDPs and Libérais of the opposition against the party in power, the Social Crédit MLAs 5 . Employers were overwhelmingly in favour of the Bill. Not a single employées voice was raised against it. Newspapers generally supported the Bill, and urged the labour movement to give the Bill a chance. Was it true that this was the first compulsory arbitration act ever passed in North America covering the private sector in peace-time ? Were labour disputes in British Columbia much worse than in other provinces ? Was Bill 33 an employers' bill ? Thèse are pertinent questions.
It was quite obvious at the beginning of this study that it would not be possible to obtain unreserved coopération from any of the parties who had an interest in making the législation work, or in its démolition. In British Columbia, probably more than in some of the other provinces, every word uttered in public concerning labour-management relations is carefully weighted and calculated to achieve the maximum political effect. Therefore, in order to accommodate the political nature inhérent in the problem under investigation, personal interviews were ruled out as a means of acquiring information. What follows is, hopefully, an objective account of why the Bill was introduced.
It appears that from a careful investigation of the labour législation of other provinces in Canada that the sensational claim that Bill 33 was the first compulsory arbitration bill ever introduced in North America covering the private sector in peace-time is not completely justified. The prairie province of Manitoba, for example, has permitted its provincial government, since 1954, to impose a ban on any work stoppages which threaten to interfère with «... opération of (a) business or functions... essential to health and well-being of the people of the province or some of them ». 6
Broadly interpreted, almost any business or function covered by the section might be considered as « essential... to the well-being of the people » 7 . This implies that a ban on strike action can be applied to the private sector as well as to the public sector. The Cabinet has the power to confirm or vary, and make binding, the award of a mediator in ail disputes affecting industry 8 . According to this interprétation, Bill 33 was certainly not the first labour législation in Canada to provide binding arbitration that covers the private sector as well as the public sector. However, the Manitoba Labour Relations Act has only been applied to employées traditionally prohibited from striking, such as police, public utihty employées, public employées and teachers, with the exception of Liquor Control Commission employées. This means that the interprétation of the Manitoba Labour Relations Act was much narrower in scope, and was applied only to workers engaged in the so-called « essential ser-vices ». If Bill 33 were actually applied to disputes in the private sector, which it was, it would not make Bill 33 the first compulsory arbitration législation in North America covering the private sector in peace-time, but it would mark the province as the first in Canada, though not in North America, to apply compulsory arbitration by the order of the Cabinet to the private sector in peace-time 9 .
Was the Bill necessary at the time when it was introduced ? Was it an employers' bill ? Labor experts in British Columbia believe that the Bill was badly needed. Hall believed that the collective bargaining process in the province was in a shocking state of disrepair 10 . Jamieson pointed out that, in 1966, the incidence of strikes in Canada exceeded that of the United States as measured by ail major indices ; i.e., percentage . If one accepts the postulate that a décline in the percentage of paid workers organized is an indication of a relative décline in power of the trade unions in the province, the timing of the Bill seems puzzling. If labour influence had declined, it was hardly necessary to introduce strong anti-labour législation at such a rime. However, if one postulâtes that the impact of the trade unions can be measured by the absolute size of the union membership, then the influence of the trade unions in British Columbia actually had increased steadily over rime. If the latter postulate is accepted, one can conclude that the introduction of the Bill was designed to curb the power of the unions. However, this explanation lacks objectivity. There must be a more satisfactory explanation of the timing of the Bill. Could it be that labour in British Columbia was more strike-prone than their fellow workers in the rest of Canada ? If there were more work stoppages in British Columbia than in other provinces before Bill 33 was introduced, then the frequency of strikes and lockouts would hâve provided the necessary catalyst for the introduction of a strong anti-labour bill.
In 1967, British Columbia had 9.91% of the labour force in Canada, or 762,000 workers as shown in Table IV . If strikes and lockouts are proportional to the size of the labour force, then, on the average, British Columbia should hâve approximately 9.91% of the total number of labour disputes in Canada. However, despite the high rate of unionization, British Columbia had less than its share of labour disputes from 1960 -1969 , with the exception of 1962 and 1969 Table V show that in 1967 British Columbia had only 8.24% of the total number of work stoppages in the nation 16 . Therefore, the hypothesis or postulate that British Columbia had more than its share of strikes and lockouts as a reason for the introduction of the Bill must be rejected. However, Table IV also shows that the gênerai trend of its share of labour disputes was on the rise from 1960-1969, with the exception of 1962-1963 and 1964-1966 . This might be an important clue. If the frequency of labour disputes increased, conceivably this could hâve led to greater public support for a strong anti-labour bill. But since British Columbia had less than its share of labour disputes in most periods before 1968, the fact that its share of labour disputes was on the rise does not appear to be a strong reason for the introduction of the Bill. The foregoing analysis overlooks one factor ; the number of work stoppages or the share of work stoppages is not the only measure of labour unrest. If the bargaining unit involved in the disputes were large, then even though the number of disputes were below the Canadian average, the number of workers involved may be relatively large. This leads one to hypothesize that the more workers are involved in labour disputes, the more likely it is that stronger anti-labour législation will be introduced. If British Columbia had more than its share of workers involved in work stoppages before the introduction of the Bill, one would suspect it might hâve contributed to the public sentiment in favour of the Bill. However, the record shows again that this could not be the reason for the introduction of Bill 33. In 1966, only 5.14% of the total number of workers involved in the work stoppages resided in British Columbia, and, in 1967, only 4.78% of them resided in British Columbia, as shown in Table IV . For 1960 -1969 Columbia is shown to hâve had less than its share of workers involved in work stoppages than many of the other provinces. However, the trend of the percentage of workers stoppages in British Columbia was generally on the increase which may hâve contributed to public sentiment in favour of the Bill for reasons similar to the ones already given.
So far, no truly compelling reason has been found for the introduction of the Bill. But it is unlikely that it was simply the whim of the politicians who wished to curb the power of the labour movement and to strengthen the alliance between the employers and the government. In a démocratie society, politicians promote a bill only when they perceive the likelihood of public support. The crucial question is what factor led the politicians of British Columbia to believe that the public was ready for such a bill. The hypothesis that the lenght of strikes may be the determining factor is worthy of exploration. There is plenty of évidence showing that strikes and lockouts were unusually long and acrimonious in British Columbia in the last ten years, especially in 1967 and 1968, when the Bill was conceived and introduced. Statistics in Table VI It is a well-known fact that long and bitter work stoppages tend to attract more attention than short ones. Therefore, in spite of the betterthan-average record of work stoppages in British Columbia, its longdrawn-out work stoppages may hâve made the people less tolérant of such inconvenience and nuisance. This was the most compelling reason that the author was able to find for the introduction of Bill 33 at that time in the province.
The political climate of the province was an influential factor also. The Social Crédit party was traditionally identified with political conservatism and financial orthodoxy. Its philosophy underlay the study of Swedish labour laws and practices by Nemetz, which were often cited as the reason for the introduction of Bill 33 18 . It has been suggested that important labour législation is often introduced after a sudden burst of work stoppages. There were over a million man-days lost in 1946, 1952 What has the Bill had accomplished in the span of slightly over two years studied hère? Perhaps it would be more reasonable to ask what the Médiation Commission has accomplished in the last two years ? Has it resolved many difficult disputes ? Has it gained the confidence of labour and management? Has it provided the urgently needed research in the field of collective bargaining ? Has it changed the attitudes of labour and management with respect to each other and toward the government ? It is not easy to formulate a complète and définitive answer to any one of thèse questions.
From the degree of opposition by the labour movement, and the cautious approach by the government with regard to compulsory sections of the Act, one would expect the Act or the Commission to be used rather sparingly with the exception of the médiation service, which is a continuation of the médiation service provided by the provincial Department of Labour before the Act was passed. Altogether, in slightly over two years, only eleven décisions were rendered by the Commission after a formai hearing, as summarized in Table VII . Among the eleven déci-sions, two were reconsiderations of décisions made earlier. In other words, only nine disputes in the past two years engaged the complète service of the Commission.
Among the nine disputes, only five were disputes in the private sector. Let us see what was the degree of compulsion involved in the four disputes in the private sector. Among thèse four décisions, one was not binding, in one it was agreed by both parties prior to the décision that they would be bound by it, and two were ordered binding on the parties by the Minister of Labour, involving the compulsory section of the Act. In short, Section 18 was invoked only two times without any equivocation 19 . It was also invoked against the construction labour dispute in the summer of 1970, but the order was later suspended and by-passed by a facesaving scheme. Therefore, it could not be regarded as a full test of the Bill. The five décisions rendered on the disputes in the public sector were accepted by the parties to the disputes.
!9 Section 18 of the Bill permits the Cabinet to order the décision of the Commission binding on the parties. 3 Voluntary means either party had made a request for a hearing, and the other party had agreed to the hearing. 4 Procédural means the parties appear before the Commission as a procédural matter after the appointaient of the médiation officer. The Médiation Commission can order a hearing without a formai request from either party.
In 1969, there were 85 work stoppages in the province, and four of the Commission's original décisions were rendered in the same year. This gave the Commission a record of complète involvement in 5.7% of the disputes involving work stoppages. However, three of the four décisions were rendered on disputes which did not resuit in a work stoppage, and the one décision which involved work stoppage was not binding on the parties, therefore the effect of the décisions by the Commission in the réduction of work stoppage was close to nil. The disputes which did not involve a work stoppage were disputes between the municipalities and the police and firemen, which would hâve been arbitrated under the coverage of the Municipal Act had the Médiation Commission not been introduced.
In 1970, only two non-reconsidered décisions were rendered by the Commission. The total number of work stoppages was greater than in 1969. Therefore, the showing of the Médiation Commission was even less impressive than the year before. Both décisions were made on disputes in the private sector. One dicision was binding due to an order of the government as well as to prior agreement between the cernent industry and the Teamsters. The other décision was ordered to be binding on 55 electric workers of the IBEW by the Minister of Labour. The number of man-days which was probably saved as a resuit of thèse décisions was relatively small compared to the total number of man-days lost during the entire year.
In 1971, two décisions were rendered. The décision on the dispute between the B.C. Hydro and Power Authority and The Amalgamated Transit Union was not binding on the parties. It was rejected by the union, which never attended the hearing, and a strike resulted. With the exception of some older people, the strike had relatively little effect on the gênerai public. The décision on the dispute between the Teamsters and the Automotive Transport Labour Relations Association was binding and was accepted by both parties. Since approximately 75% of the industry was affected by the seven-day strike and lockout, a lengthy strike could hâve caused substantial damage to the B.C. economy. One is inclined to crédit the use of section 18, in this instance, as an effective protection of public interest.
Finally, a word should be said about the hearing on a dispute involving psychiatrie nurses in 1968 which was held before the Médiation Commission Act was proclaimed. The décision was accepted by both parties.
IMPORTANT RÉCENT DISPUTES
It would be misleading to think that the entire history of the Média-tion Commission Act can be summarized in the number of décisions made by the Commission. The important labour disputes which were dealt with outside of the commissions are at least as important to our évaluation of the effectiveness of the Commission as the décisions themselves. Some of the events should shed light on the effectiveness of the Médiation Commission.
After five hearings by the Médiation Commission, and after a year had elapsed since the Act was passed in the Législature, the controversial Section 18 of the Médiation Commission still had not been tested. When the operating engineers struck the Vancouver schools, resulting in cancellation of classes for 70,000 students, it was expected that the government would intervene in the form of compulsory arbitration. A médiation officer had been appointed in December of the previous year to assist the parties to reach a settlement. Following the report of a médiation officer, and subséquent action on January 23, the Médiation Commission held a preliminary inquiry, which led to a hearing on January 28, 1970. The hearing was not ordered under Section 18 of the Act. The operating engineers, however, refused to appear before the Commission. Under the Médiation Commission Act, the Commission has the power to compel the attendance of witnesses, but this power was not used. The union and the Vancouver School Board had agreed in private to submit their dispute to a private independent arbitrator, and there was to be no work stoppage when the arbitration was in progress. As a resuit of this agreement, the hearing ended. This marked the first time that a party attempted, and succeeded, to avoid the hearing of the Médiation Commission.
Other long and bitter disputes which would hâve provided idéal testing grounds for the Médiation Commission, took place in 1970. However, several were beyond the jurisdiction of the Médiation Commission. One such dispute was the long-drawn-out dispute between the West Coast Long-shoremen and the Maritime Employers' Association. It lasted from September 25, 1969 to November 8, 1969 . The strike ended when a trace was called. The strike resumed on February 5, 1970 until February 12, 1970 . As a resuit of the first strike 101,510 man-days were lost ; 19,380 man-days were lost in the second strike. The total number of workers involved in the dispute was 3,230 20 .
The longshore industry is covered by the Industrial Labour Relations and Disputes Investigation Act, which is fédéral législation. The secondary effect of the longshore dispute on the economy of British Columbia was substantial. It affected the export of primary products such as lumber, pulp and paper, minerai ores, which are the major export products of the province. There was nothing that the Médiation Commission could do to résolve the longshore dispute. An unfair burden is put on the Médiation Commission when gross statistics are cited to measure its effectiveness.
Another important dispute was that between the Printers' Union and the Pacific Press, which publishes two of the largest newspaper in the province, the Sun and the Province. A lockout resulted when Pacific Press accused employées of practising slowdowns. The lockout began on February 16, and ended on May 10, 1970. It involved only 1,200 employées, the union started publishing a newspaper named the Vancouver Express during the lockout. The public was not unduly inconvenienced. However, the négative publicity generated due to the absence of regular newspapers 20 The Labour Gazette, February and May, 1970, p. 175 and p. 390. ave the people of the province a feeling of frustration which probably eightened their expectation of what the Médiation Commission should accomplish.
THE CONSTRUCTION DISPUTE
The largest work stoppage of the year took place in the construction industry. Nine unions were locked out by the Construction Labour Relations Association of British Columbia from April 14, 1970. It was estimated that 80% of construction work in British Columbia areas halted 21 . The dispute was expected to be long-drawn-out as a resuit of the certification of the Construction Labour Relations Association as a bargaining agent for the majority of the large construction firms in the province. In the month of July, the government of the province decided that it could no longer tolerate the protracted work stoppage. The Minister of Labour requested the employers to lift the lockout and the union members to return to work. CLRA complied with the request, but the unions refused to take heed of the request. A back-to-work order was issued on July 18, 1970 under Sections 18 and 21 of the Médiation Commission Act. Under Section 21, workers must return to work within 24 hours after the order is issued. Ail the unions which did not reach agreement with the CLRA, except the Teamsters, defied the order of the government. The Médiation Commission began preliminary hearings. AU the unions affiliated with the BCFL boycotted the hearings ; only the Teamsters showed up 22 . The Premier of the province intervened personally and ordered the men back to work. A compromise was reached, in that the Deputy Minister of Labour was named as mediator, and the unions recommended to their members that they return to work no later than July 27, 1970. The proceedings before the Médiation Commission were postponed indefinitely 23 . Neither the unions nor the union members were prosecuted by the government for violation of the back-to-work order. The work stoppage lasted over three months. The Médiation Commission was successfully by-passed by labour with the coopération of the government. This marked the second time that a major dispute was mediated outside the Médiation Commission Industrial Relations Bulletin, Vol, 2, No. 29, July 24, 1970, p. 5 . Deputy Minister of Labour, Bill Sands, was named mediator after the parties could not agrée on an independent mediator. 24 The first major dispute which by-passed the Commission was the ap>poitment of Mr. Nemetz to médiate the forestry dispute as explained in the succeeding paragraph.
the Forest Industrial Relations Limited, and the Minister of Labour had agreed to the appointment of Mr. Justice Nathan Nemetz of the British Columbia Court of Appeal to assist the parties in their dispute on July 6, 1970. The parties had agreed not to conduct any lockout or strike during the judge's study of the dispute. The appointment of the judge was made under Section 34 of the Médiation Commission Act which provides that « experts and persons having spécial or technical knowledge » can be called upon to help the Commission carry out its duties. Despite the fact that Section 34 was not intended to shunt the médiation process to an outsider, it was invoked in order to avoid a showdown between the government and organized labour. This was the first time that a major dispute, which involved 28,000 workers, was mediated by a person outside the Médiation Commission. Thèse two events had greatly undermined the status and importance of the Médiation Commission.
In between the periods of thèse two concessions made by the government to organized labour, the well-publicized towboat strike took place : between May 3 and June 15, 1970. By May 20, 14,000 of the employées in the forest industry were laid off as a resuit of illégal secondary boycotts by the towboat employées. Nearly 5,000 of the 10,000 employées of the pulp and paper industry were also laid off because of illégal picketing. On May 15, the Merchant Service Guild had to answer 28 writs and 11 anti-picketing injunctions since the strike began 25 . Again, the Médiation Commission did not hâve jurisdiction over the dispute, as in the case of the longshore strike. The towboat dispute was covered under fédéral jurisdiction. However, the long and bitter dispute could not help but give the Médiation Commission an unfavourable image in the eyes of the gênerai public, which was unaware of the fine distinction between provincial jurisdiction and fédéral jurisdiction 26 .
THE COMMISSIONS EFFECTIVENESS
In light of the foregoing analysis, one can see that the actual impact of the Médiation Commission on the economy of British Columbia was small. In the disputes which did or could seriously affect the economy of British Columbia, such as the construction industry dispute and the IWA dispute, the Commission was by-passed by the government in its attempt to pacify organized labour.
The only décision which appears to hâve benefited the B.C. economy was that in the dispute between the Teamsters and the Automative Transport Labour Relations Association which took place in February of 1971. However, the legality of the « struck good » issue was evidently in question. It was doubtful whether the strike would hâve caused substantial damage to the economy over any issue of which the immédiate benefit to the members was not apparent 27 . The causes for a lengthy strike were conspicuously absent. It would be a short strike without government intervention.
In other disputes which seriously affected the B.C. economy, such as the longshore dispute and the towboat dispute, the Commission did not hâve jurisdiction. However, the Commission had served a function, which was ignored by the press, in protecting employées and employers who were not parties to the dispute from encroachment on their rights by the disputing parties.
The Médiation Commission is not necessarily powerless and defunct. Reading the décisions of the Commission, one cannot help but be impressed by the fact that the Commission has performed a function which has not been given the attention it deserves. Its purpose is not only to hand down a décision which the parties agrée to, but also to protect the employées and employers, who are not parties to the dispute ; freedom from encroachment on their rights is protected by the laws of the land 28 . The Médiation Commission also has contributed substantially to much needed research on the nature and characteristics of collective agreements in British Columbia. It has collected over 3 thousand collective agreements and has placed contract information on the computer, thus providing the most comprehensive analysis of collective agreements in North America. However, the Commission has not succeeded in changing the attitudes of any parties in the labour-management-government relationship. Perhaps due to the lack of sensitivity to the feelings of the labour movement in gênerai, the Commission appears to hâve actually aggravated the already poor relationship between the labour movement and the government. The remark made by the Chairman of the Médiation Commission that public employées should not hâve the right to strike led many to question his qualification to act as an impartial Chairman of a neutral body 29 . The luxurious office of the Commission has also unnecessarily aroused the négative feelings of labour.
CONCLUSIONS
Without a doubt, the Médiation Commission has so far failed to alter the trend of increasingly lengthy and bitter labour disputes in the province. Some blâme the controversial Section 18 of the Médiation Commission 27 The Teamsters wanted the right to refuse to handle trucks which are driven across the picket line by non-union personnel. Also cf. Médiation Commission Déci-sion, March 29, 1971, pp. 4-9. 28 Décisions of the Médiation Commission, 1968 -1971 Canadian Labour Laws Cases, Vol. 4, 1967 -1969 14, 142 and etc. 29 Public employées in the fédéral government in Canada hâve the right to strike. Also see the Public Service Staff Relations Act, 1967. Act as the major obstacle to the operational effectiveness of the Médiation Commission. Some hâve suggested that the failure of the Commission was mainly the fault of the présent chairman and that a better qualified, more highly respected chairman would hâve done a better job. Obviously, without Section 18, the Médiation Commission would not hâve commanded such attention or criticism. It would be no différent from hundreds of other such médiation and conciliation bodies. To suggest that labour would be more coopérative if a more acceptable chairman of the Commission were appointed is to ignore the political reality of the province. It is quite unlikely that the différences between government and labour could be patched up by changing the chairman of the Médiation Commission.
What is likely to happen now ? Bill 33 is not working. To remove Section 18 is to castrate the Bill. To change the chairman of the Commission is not likely to lead to any better results. What can be done to improve the industrial relations System in the province ?
It seems clear that compulsion has never been successful in reducing the number of industrial disputes. Australia has « no-work-stoppage » législation since 1904, yet, in the last ten years, she has had more work stoppages than Canada with a smaller population 30 . During the Second législation since 1904, yet, in the last ten years, she has had more work World War, the United States had about the same average number of work stoppages as either before or after the War. Without a doubt, the spirit of coopération between labour and management was higher during the War than during any other time-period. Work stoppages were made illégal in the war industries, yet they took place. Many of the current wave of strikes such as the postal strike, the railway strikes, teachers' strikes and nurses' strikes in the United States are illégal under either fédéral or state labour législation, yet they occur. Time and again, the government has had to refrain from prosecution of workers who hâve openly flaunted government orders, for sheer lack of resources to make such prosecutions. One is forced to conclude that labour cannot be forced to work when it décides to contest the power of the government.
Obviously, repeal of Section 18 of Bill 33, or a return of the power of ordering compulsory arbitration to législature, will please labour 31 . If the government were willing to make such a concession, it might persuade labour to be more coopérative, thus perhaps reducing the tension in industrial disputes. This would enable the Médiation Commission to function in a less emotional atmosphère. The Commission would then be no différent from many other such bodies, but it could at least provide urgently needed research and impartial opinions, which are necessary for a rational approach to labour disputes. This is not a solution to the problem, but it might provide a step in the right direction.
This study concludes that the Médiation Commission has been given an essentially impossible task ; that Section 18 of Bill 33 should be repealed ; and that the power to order binding arbitration should be returned to the législature.
L'arbitrage obligatoire en Colombie Britannique : le Bill 33
La loi sur l'arbitrage obligatoire en Colombie Britannique date de 1968. On a dit de cette législation qu'elle était la première du genre en Amérique du Nord s'appliquant au secteur privé. Cette législation portait deux noms : le Bill 33 et le Médiation Commission Act. Cette loi confie à une commission de médiation le soin d'enquêter lors des conflits du travail. La Commission, tant dans ses actes que dans ses réunions, se conduit comme un Tribunal, mais elle a la qualité d'être plus flexible qu'un Tribunal du travail dans l'audition des témoignages, dans l'assignation des témoins et dans la procédure. L'article 18 de cette loi donne au Cabinet le pouvoir d'imposer un règlement aux parties pour une période de deux ans lorsque l'intérêt public le demande, à la suite d'une décision de la Commission de médiation. N'importe laquelle des deux parties impliquées dans le conflit, ou le Ministre du travail lui-même, peuvent exiger la tenue d'une enquête. La décision peut être rendue exé-cutoire avant la tenue de l'enquête si les deux parties y ont consenti d'avance.
Mais en fait, cette législation sur l'arbitrage obligatoire n'est pas la première du genre en Amérique du Nord. Le Manitoba et un certain nombre d'États améri-cains ont passé des législations semblables au cours de la première guerre mondiale. Cependant c'est la première fois au Canada que l'arbitrage obligatoire, tel que défini dans la loi, est appliqué aux industries du secteur privé autres que les utilités publiques en temps de paix.
C'est pendant une période où le public était de plus en plus mécontent de la montée grandissante de longues grèves qu'on a décidé de présenter cette loi. En 1966, l'incidence des grèves au Canada était beaucoup plus forte qu'aux États-Unis comme l'indiquent les mesures principales, c'est-à-dire le pourcentage des journées de travail perdues, le pourcentage de syndiqués impliqués, la fréquence relative et la durée moyenne. En 1968, le Canada arrivait bon premier parmi les pays occidentaux pour le nombre de jours-hommes perdus par mille personnes employées ; d'où la réaction que les syndicats étaient trop forts en Colombie Britannique. En 1969, 40.9% des salariés de cette province étaient syndiqués. C'est le plus haut pourcentage au pays. La province tenait le première place au chapitre du niveau général des salaires. Même si le nombre de grèves et le nombre de travailleurs impliqués dans ces grèves étaient plus petit en Colombie Britanunique que dans le pays en général, lorsque l'on base la distribution sur la population, cette province a connu des durées 31 Recently the back to work order was issued to the Teamsters in their dispute with the ATLRA only after the debate in the législature. ATLRA was aliso ordered to lift the lockout. L'ARBITRAGE OBLIGATOIRE EN COLOMBIE BRITANNIQUE : LE BILL 33 763 de grèves 70% plus élevées que la moyenne nationale pour la dernière décade. Prenant en considération la tendance pro-patronale de la législature, la loi sur la Commission de médiation était inévitable.
Cependant, cette législation n'a pas réussi à réduire ni la fréquence ni la durée des grèves. Cette faillite peut en partie être attribuée au manque de bonne volonté de la part du gouvernement qui se traduit par son absence de recours à l'article 18 de la loi. Une autre explication réside dans la séparation des pouvoirs en matière de conflits du travail entre les gouvernements provincial et fédéral ainsi qu'à l'insuccès de la part de la Commission à inspirer confiance aux chefs du mouvement syndical. Souventes fois, le gouvernement a permis l'intervention de médiateurs ou d'arbitres privés au lieu de référer les conflits importants à la Commission de médiation. Ceci n'a fait que nuire au statut de cette Commission. Cette dernière n'a jamais pu se relever de la perte de prestige qu'elle a subie lorsqu'elle fut mise de côté à l'occasion du règlement du conflit dans l'industrie de la forêt, l'industrie la plus importante de la Colombie Britannique. Alors le gouvernement n'as pas supporté l'ordre donné aux travailleurs de la construction de retourner au travail, ordre donné sous l'article de la loi. Très peu de gens sont convaincus que le gouvernement est prêt à faire face au mouvement syndical lorsque ce mouvement est uni dans ses décisions et est prêt à défier le gouvernement. Les longs et sévères conflits qui suivirent dans les industries du débardage et des remorqueurs relevaient de la juridiction fédérale. Il en résultat que la loi de la Commission de la médiation était sans aucun pouvoir. Finalement, le président de la Commission a été constamment attaqué par le mouvement syndical : ceci a créé des difficultés supplémentaires lorsque le gouvernement a décidé de se servir de l'article 18. Tous ces facteurs ont contribué à rendre la loi sur la Commission de médiation relativement inefficace.
Pendant une durée de 28 mois, la Commission n'a rendu que 11 décisions dont 2 révisions. Quatre des neuf décisions concernaient des conflits dans le secteur privé. Parmi celles-ci, deux ont été rendues exécutoires par le Cabinet provincial. Parmi les deux autres, une n'était pas exécutoire alors que l'autre l'était suite à l'accord mutuel des parties impliquées. Parmi les cinq décisions touchant des conflits dans le secteur public, le syndicat en accepta quatre et en refusa une. Ces conflits affectèrent moins de 5% des conflits du travail en Colombie Britannique et même moins en termes de nombre de travailleurs concernés. Leur effet sur l'économie provinciale était négligeable. La réalisation majeure de cette loi a été de fournir des opinions légales sérieuses concernant les conflits, opinions qui furent souvent ignorées, et de compléter des recherches originales par ordinatur sur les caractéristiques des conventions collectives dans cette province.
Sans aucun doute, la loi sur la Commission de médiation en Colombie Britannique n'a pas réussi à faire éviter les longs et pénibles conflits industriels. Considé-rant le climat des relations du travail dans cette province à l'heure actuelle, il est très improbable de prévoir une utilisation plus efficace de l'article 18 dans le futur. Ce dont on a d'abord besoin dans cette province, c'est d'un esprit de coopération entre les syndicats, la direction et le gouvernement. La révocation de l'article 18 de cette loi pourrait entraîner la création d'un tel esprit. Le climat de cette province nous amène à conclure qu'il ne serait pas surprenant de voir cet article 18 abrogé dans un avenir très proche.
